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3i Statement of Facts: 
Ordinarily, it is not necessary to set forth facts in a Reply Brief, but because 
the Defendant's Answering Brief ignored the standard of review that the Court 
should "view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party" {Krantz v. Holt, 819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991)), it is appropriate 
that certain of the key facts supported by the Record be set forth at the outset of 
this Reply Brief. 
1. Prior to the incident in this case, Defendant Jess had signs erected at two 
of her Duchesne motels (depo. of CJ. p. 7 lines 12-19). Those signs had 
been erected under her direction (depo of C. J. p.8 lines 9-18; and see, p. 
16 lines 8-12): 
A. [By Connie Jess] I'm trying to think. I think that 
was done by a crew that was working for me at the time. 
Q. [By Mr. Bennion] A construction crew? 
A. Well, yes. 
Q. Were they working for any other contractor or just for you? 
A. Just for me. 
# # # 
Q. But if you have some do work for you, you want them to do it 
like you want it, don't you? 
A. Sounds like a good idea. 
In erecting the prior signs, Jess had arranged for a friend to provide a crane 
free of charge (see depo of C.J. page 10 line 4 to page 11 line 9) or use a 
truck with a boom (depo. of Jess, p. 13,11. 5-10). 
Before ordering the pipe in this case, Jess had measured the diameter of the 
existing pipe stub over which she intended to install the new pipe as the 
main stand for a large sign (depo. of C.J. p. 21,1. 10 - p. 22,1. 6): 
Q. Okay. And did you tell him the diameter of pipe that you 
wanted? 
A. I probably did. 
Q. And how did you know what diameter of pipe you would need? 
I guess you knew how big the pipe was that it was going to go over, 
right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you measure that pipe yourself? 
A. Of course. 
Q. I'm talking about the stub, the one that protected the 
telephone booth. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you just do that with a tape of some kind? Do you 
remember how you did that? 
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A. "Yes I imagine it was .1 tape, 
- \i- - because she wanted 
il h. IM1 higher llinn llic sign lighi m,\\ 1, ii |<li"|»c- ..I "i ( ^ 1 I , , n, I Hi 
pa r t i cub : IK igia ihcu ) o u ordered of r ; p e from M i . ' 
A . • \< , . 
Q And was there something that-was there some reason to haw 
that higl 1 of a piece of pipe as opposed to 1.2 foot? *• x exampu 
because other signes were r : e area and you,, wanted 10 U_ abov_ 
them or there was some obstruct ion or something? 
A. Yes, 
After deten 1 iii ling tl t.e dii 1: lei isioi is for the needed pipe, Jess contacted 
tl ie pi 1 rcl 1a se ai it. : I deli \ ^ ei y of a 1 lsed pip e aboi it 20 feet ii t, 1. 
After agreeing 1 ipoi 1. a price for tl t.e pipe, Jess asked 1 .1 tat t ,1 t - - \y 
20 foot segment of an 8-inch diameter pipe be delivered to her v> H the 
Ri< Danuan N I< >tel (depo of C J. p. 20 line 6 to p. 22 line 12; p. 23 lines 
8-1 5: p. 24 lines 1.0 1.8; see also affidavit of Robert K. Lankford, paragraphs 
b , ; c iepo. ( >f C . K . { >. : Iii ic .s 21-24; p . 8 lines 8-10 and 13-16). 
At. tl: ie til 1: ie si ie 1 1 lade tl t.e ai 1: ai tgemei its for delivery oi tiie pip*., ^.1. -no not 
a pt . ,. wer 
another pipe still 1 and rnvlnII is .1 si^n | Ii III hri pioperty (ili'p »l l ) . , 
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p.22,11.7-12): 
Q. Did you tell Mr. Kelsey that you wanted the pipe erected at the 
time or did you just say-
A. No, I did not at the time. 
Q. Okay. So you just told him you wanted it delievered; is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
8. There was never any contract, express or implied, between the Defendant 
Jess and AmeriKan for the installation of the pipe (depo of C.J. p. 20 line 
6 to p. 22 line 12; p. 23 lines 8-15; p. 24 lines 10-18; see also affidavit of 
Robert K. Lankford, paragraphs 5-7; depo. of C.K. p. 7 lines 21-24; p. 8 
lines 8-10 and 13-16). 
9. Initially, when Dennis Jensen accepted the assignment from his employer 
AmeriKan to deliver the pipe, he did not know that Jess would later ask him 
to stand the pipe up or to hoist it for installation over another pipe (depo. 
of Dennis Jensen,1 p. 10,11. 6-12; p. 13,11. 4-9; p. 45,11. 1-5; p. 47,11. 20-
22). 
10. Craig Kelsey, the owner of AmeriKan, also was unaware that Jess would 
later insist that the pipe would be hoisted over another pipe (depo. of C.K. 
p. 8,11. 13 t op . 9, line 6). 
1
 Hereinafter referred to as "depo of D.J." 
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11. Kelsey would have never assigned Jensen to perform the erection of the 
pipe, but rather would have sent a backhoe operator and a backhoe so that 
the pipe could have been raised to a sufficient height for safe installation 
over the stub. Id. 
12. If Jess had said that she wanted the pipe erected over another pipe already 
in place, Kelsey would have either refused the job or provided special 
equipment to raise the pipe safely to the necessary height (depo of C.K. p. 
8 11. 17 to p. 9 line 6; p. 13 11. 22 to p. 14 1. 4; p. 14 11. 21 to p. 15 1. 5). 
13. After Jensen had arrived at the site, Jess directed him to hoist the pipe; 
Jensen then told Jess and her handyman that he did not have the proper 
equipment to do the work in the safest manner; he felt that the job 
necessitated the use of a crane and a welder (depo of D.J., p. 48,11. 13 to p. 
49 1.11). 
14. Despite Jensen's protests, Jess demanded that Jensen hoist and install the 
pipe. Id. and see p. 48 1. 23 to p. 49,1. 15: 
Q. [By Mr. Minnock] What equipment did you feel like you 
wanted to have that day? 
A. [By Mr. Jensen] If I was to do it and line it up myself, I would 
get a crane. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And welder. 
Q. Okay. Why did you go ahead and do it if you didn't feel you 
7 
had appropriate equipment that day? 
A. I felt we could do it. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But it's not the safest way to do it, but she asked me to put it 
up. In fact, she demanded me to. 
Q. Did you tell Miss Jess that you didn't have the equipment? 
A As I recollect, I told her I did not come equipped to put it up. 
The equipment that Jensen had with him when he thought he was merely 
delivering the pipe was adequate for such a delivery, but inadequate to raise 
the pipe high enough safely to install it over the pipe stub as Jess demanded 
(see depo of D.J., p. 44,11. 23- p. 45 1. 5, p. 48,11. 13-20, and 1. 22 to p. 49, 
I. 15): 
Q. [By Mr. Bennion] And you basically told her at the outset that 
you weren't prepared to do that with the equipment you had; 
correct? 
A. [By Mr. Jensen] Yes. I told her I was sent there to deliver the 
pipe and set it down. 
Q. And when you came back the next day [the day after the 
injury], it was with a different piece of equipment? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And it was Craig Kelsey's backhoe? 
A. Yes. 
While attempting to raise the pipe high enough to install it over the pipe 
stub already in place as directed by Defendant Jensen (depo of D.J., p. 20, 
II. 2-17, p. 46,11. 2-9) and depo of Thompson, p. 40,11. 23 to p. 43,1. 2), 
the unstable pipe slipped and bounced, severely injuring Trever Thompson's 
8 
right leg, resulting in its amputation below the knee: 
Q. [By Mr. Bennion] Aand so, by not having a high enough piece 
of equipment and a long piece of pipe, you basically could get it high 
enough to get it over that stub like Connie [Jess] wanted? 
A. [By Mr. Jensen] Correct. 
Q. And the next day with the backhoe you didn't have any of 
those problems? 
A None whatsoever. 
Although Jensen had stood pipes many times in the past while working in 
the oil fields, he had never tried to hoist a pipe like this and install it over 
another pipe already in place (depo of D.J. p 30,11. 9-17): 
Q. [By Mr. Minnock] That's what I'm wondering. Is that where 
you had occasion to do this, is in the oil field? 
A. [By Mr. Jensen] Yes, in the oil field. I have never set a pipe 
over another pipe, that I could recall. 
Q. Okay. But in terms of raising the pipe and getting it to go 
striaght up in the air, you have? 
A. Raising it, yes. Setting it over another one, no. 
After the injury to Plaintiff, AmeriKan sent different equipment (a back 
hoe) to do the job. The owner of AmeriKan testified that he would have 
sent the back hoe to do the job the first day or would have refused to do the 
job had he been informed Jess had wanted the pipe hoisted and installed 
over another pipe (C.K., p. 8,1. 13 to p. 9,1. 6). 
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4. Summary of Reply Argument: 
When the facts and inferences favorable to Plaintiff are considered, a 
genuine issue of material fact exists for determination by the trier of fact 
concerning whether Defendant retained control over at least a part of the work. 
Under the particular facts of this case, Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff. 
This case involves a situation where an inherently dangerous condition existed 
under at least partial control of the Defendant. Under such circumstances 
Defendant should not be allowed to shield herself from liability merely because 
she contracted for the purchase and delivery of a piece of pipe. As was argued 
below to the trial court, Plaintiff, who was a mere bystander at the time of his 
injury, should be able to proceed against Defendant. The public policy reasons 
offered by Defendant to avoid liability, if accepted here, would exculpate 
Defendant from her wrong-doing in this case. Other courts have devised rules 
which would result in a fair outcome under facts such as those present here. 
5. REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
As is evident from a comparison of the Defendant Jess' Statement of Facts 
with Plaintiffs Statement of Facts, Defendant has carefully selected and 
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highlighted certain references in the record which are favorable to Defendant. This, 
of course, is in conflict with the appropriate standard of review on a motion for 
summary judgment. In this case, contrary to Defendant's approach, those facts 
and inferences favorable to Plaintiff must be considered in determinining whether 
the Trial Court's granting of summary judgment was appropriate. Krantz v. Holt, 
819 P.2d 352, 353 (Utah 1991). 
Plaintiff Thompson has called the Court's attention to the appropriate 
portions of the Record in the paragraphs set forth above. 
II. When Considered In the Light Most Favorable to Plaintiff, the Record 
Supports a Finding that Defendant Jess Owed a Duty of Care to 
Plaintiff. 
The record shows that Mr. Jensen's employer agreed only to sell and deliver 
a piece of pipe. Mr. Jensen was assigned to make the simple delivery, and he 
completed his specified task when he delivered the pipe to Defendant. Defendant 
then demanded that Mr. Jensen hoist the pipe and install it over a shorter pipe 
stub. Although Mr. Jensen was not properly equipped (as Defendant should have 
known from her prior experience), Defendant nevertheless demanded that the 
work be performed by Mr. Jensen as she directed. 
Clearly, at that point, Defendant had assumed control over the job and had 
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given directions as to how the job should be completed. It cannot be argued with 
any merit that Mr. Jensen's employer had control over this work because he 
wasn't even aware that it was or could be taking place. Moreover, Mr. Jensen's 
employer would have used different equipment had he known what Defendant 
wanted done. 
At the time he hoisted the pipe and tried to install it, Mr. Jensen was acting 
as a "volunteer" for Defendant at her insistance and under her direction. 
Contrary to Defendant's argument, it is clear that Defendant Jess indeed 
retained control over the operative details of at least part of the work. She 
directed Jensen to hoist the pipe and install it over the stub, knowing that the only 
equipment available to Mr. Jensen at the time was Mr. Jensen's own truck. Under 
Dayton v. Free, 148 Pac. 408, 412 (Utah 1914), and under the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, §414 (1965), Defendant's actions created a duty of care which 
she owed to Plaintiff Thompson: 
And, as has been seen, it having neither reserved nor 
exercised direction or control over the work, or the time 
or manner of doing it, it owed him no duty to provide a 
safe place to work, or to warn or notify him of missed 
holes, or to guard him against dangers incident to or 
created by the prosecution of the work, and certainly not 
to guard or protect him against the negligence of those 
who had employed him or with whom he had labored. 
Dayton v. Free, 148 Pac. 412. 
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Under the foregoing language of Dayton, this Court implied that if a person 
either directed or controled the work, or the time or manner of doing it, then such 
a person owes a duty to provide a safe place, to warn, and to guard. Here, 
Defendant Jess demanded that Mr. Jensen immediately proceed to hoist and 
install the pipe over the stub. Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable inference that 
such insistance constituted direction and control over the work. 
Restatement §414 states: 
One who entrusts work to an independent contractor, 
but who retains the control of any part of the work, is 
subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose 
safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable 
care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control 
with reasonable care. [Emphasis added.] 
Here, the only work "entrusted" to the independent contractor AmeriKan 
by Defendant Jess was the delivery of the pipe. Since Defendant Jess had not 
even informed AmeriKan or its owner Craig Kelsey of any other work to be 
performed, a reasonable inference arises that control and direction of all other 
parts of the remaining work were retained by Defendant Jess. The remaining work 
that was performed was accomplished at Defendant's insistance and direction. 
From the facts in the Record, Plaintiff Thompson is certainly entitled to a 
13 
reasonable inference that Defendant Jess generally directed an controled "any part 
of the work"--that part being everything that happened after the pipe was 
delivered, including hoisting and installing it. Focusing on the specific parts of 
the work which were retained and controlled by Defendant, the Record reveals 
that Defendant demanded that Mr. Jensen hoist the pipe and install it over the 
stub. She insisted that the work be done immediately. In so doing, she knew, or 
should have known, that it would be necessary for him to use his truck to do the 
job, since that was the only equipment he had. At the same time, she knew that 
she had not contracted with Mr. Jensen's employer to have that work done. She 
also knew that on prior occasions, it was necessary to install her other sign-poles 
with the use of a crane or boom-truck. 
A review of the comment to Section 414 also confirms that Defendant Jess 
owed a duty of care to Plaintiff Thompson under these particular circumstances. 
The comment provides: 
c. In order for the rule stated in this section to apply, 
the employer must have retained at least some degree of 
control over the manner in which the work is done. It is 
not enough that he has merely assumed a general right 
to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its 
progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or 
recommendations which need not necessarily be 
followed, or to prescribe alterations or deviations. Such 
a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it 
14 
does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his 
methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must 
be such a retention of a right of supervision that the 
contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own 
way. [Emphasis added.] 
Here, the independent contractor (AmeriKan) did not in any way retain the 
right of supervision or the right to direct or control that part of the work which 
involved hoisting and installing the pipe. This is true, of course, because 
Defendant Jess did not inform AmeriKan that this is what she wanted done. 
Instead of giving AmeriKan the opportunity to plan and conduct the work 
in a manner which would have been safe, Defendant Jess surprised AmeriKan's 
employee, Mr. Jensen, with her demand that the work be done immediately and 
to her specifications. Neither Craig Kelsey of AmeriKan nor, for that matter, Mr. 
Jensen was "entirely free to do the work in his own way." Defendant Jess did 
take control over at least one of the key operative details of the work2: she 
demanded that the pipe be hoisted and installed over the stub. Mr. Jensen had 
no option, for example, of digging a hole, placing the pipe in the hole and back-
filling around the pipe with concrete. Further, because Defendant Jess insisted 
2
 Plaintiff Thompson does not dispute that Mr. Jensen did in fact 
determine some of the details (such as what kind of hitch to use). This does 
not negate the fact that Defendant Jess directed and controlled other parts of 
the work. 
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that the work be done immediately, Mr. Jensen also did not have the option of 
returning to his equipment yard and bringing back a crane and a welder (as he 
said he would have done if given the opportunity). Instead, he was limited to 
using his truck and A-frame, equipment which was not the safest equipment for 
such a job. Defendant Jess knew what equipment was available to Mr. Jensen 
when she insisted that he proceed to hoist and install the pipe. She also knew 
that cranes and boom-trucks had been used when she had directed similar work 
before. 
Thus, Plaintiff has raised at the very least a factual question as to whether 
Defendant Jess controlled and directed the work. If the trier of fact finds that Ms. 
Jess did direct or control any part of the work, then Defendant owes a duty of care 
to Plaintiff and others who might be injured when the work is carried out 
consistent with the manner she directed or controlled. 
Defendant argues (at p. 18 of her brief) that "Mr. Jensen did not use his 
vehicle to raise the pipe based on any direction or control exercised by Ms. Jess." 
This contention is misleading because, while Ms. Jess did not specificially say to 
Mr. Jensen, "Use your truck," she did insist that the work be done immediately 
and she knew that the truck was the only equipment which Mr. Jensen had. In 
essence, then, by her insistence, she was directing him to use his truck. Defendant 
16 
Jess gave him no opportunity to obtain other, safer equipment. 
Next (at page 19), Defendant argues that no one forced Mr. Jensen to raise 
the pipe-he could have walked away if he did not feel comfortable. If such an 
argument were given any weight, then it is unlikely that any plaintiff would ever 
have a cause of action when injured in a situation made dangerous by another. 
Defendant continues her line of argument (at pages 19-20) by noting that 
Mr. Jensen continued to perform the work [as directed by Ms. Jess] because he felt 
he could do it. The issue of fact here is not whether Mr. Jensen felt he could do 
the job, but whether Defendant Jess, because of her prior experience, knew or 
should have known that the work required special precautions to be safe. While 
Mr. Jensen had stood pipe vertically before on many occasions, he had never 
hoisted a pipe to install it over another as Defendant Jess demanded in this case. 
Finally, Defendant argues (at page 20) that holding Defendant Jess 
responsible here would result in a bad precedent for homeowners in cases where 
(for example) a plumber or electrician is injured doing work which he thought he 
could perform. Again, this argument is misplaced. A more closely analogous case 
would be where the homeowner (Defendant Jess) contracts with a plumber 
(AmeriKan) to fix a leak (drop off pipe), but then when a relatively inexperienced 
worker is sent to the job (Mr. Jensen) and could fix the leak, but is instead 
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required by the homeowner to repair a loose wire (hoist and install the pipe) 
under circumstances where the homeowner knows from her prior experience with 
such repairs that special equipment should be used. If such a worker injures 
another person while carrying out the homeowner's instructions, it is reasonable 
that the homeowner be held responsible, at least in part, for such injury. 
Hence, Plaintiff Thompson was indeed injured because of certain actions 
and inaction of Defendant Jess who retained control and direction over at least a 
part of the work. Thus, the "retained control" doctrine certainly does apply here. 
The Trial Court erred in failing to recognize that genuine issues of material fact 
existed with respect to these matters. 
III. Plaintiff Seeks to Have Restatement Sections 413, 416, and 427 
Apply in Particular Cases Such as this Where an "Inherently 
Dangerous" Situation Occurs Under the Direction or Control of the 
Defendant Owner. 
In a situation where the work involved is "inherently dangerous" and where 
Defendant owner has assumed control over or direction of such work, Defendant 
has the responsibility to require whatever special precautions are needed to 
perform that work safely. Restatement of Torts 2d §413 and §414. It is 
18 
undisputed that the court below recognized that the work involved in this case 
indeed "may have been inherently dangerous." See Ruling p. 2.3 The error 
committed by the court below was that it failed to find that a jury should decide 
whether Defendant retained control over the work and whether Defendant 
exercised reasonable care to provide necessary precautions. 
Defendant's argument in her Answering Brief discusses and cites the 
majority of case authority from other jurisdictions on this point, but only under 
facts where the defendant owner does not retain any control or direction over the 
work. Because of the unusual factual context of this case where the Defendant did 
retain control over the work, the authority relied upon by Defendant should not 
be applied here. Cases cited by Plaintiff in his opening brief support this 
conclusion. 
If Defendant's view of the applicable law were accepted in this case, the 
Defendant would escape liability for her negligence simply because she contracted 
with AmeriKan to purchase and deliver a pipe. Defendant should not be allowed 
to use that contractual arrangement to shield herself from liability for her 
negligence and for exposing Plaintiff to an inherently dangerous situation without 
3
 The fact that the mishap during the installation of this heavy pipe 
resulted in such severe injuries to Plaintiff is dramatic illustration that this 
work was "inherently dangerous." 
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providing appropriate protection, especially when she changed the fundamental 
character of the assignment by demanding the hoisting and erecting of the pipe 
with inadequate equipment. 
IV. Courts in Other Jurisdictions Have Found Ways to Avoid the Public 
Policy Issues Raised by Defendant. 
Defendant has raised a number of arguments relating to issues of "fairness" 
and public policy. These issues, however, should not block Plaintiff in this case 
from obtaining relief from Defendant. Cases dealing with these questions have 
found rational solutions. In applying the rules of those cases here, Plaintiff 
concedes that certainly Plaintiff should not enjoy any double recovery. Moreover, 
Plaintiff further concedes that, if AmeriKan (or its employee Jensen, acting within 
the scope of his employment) were responsible for a portion of Plaintiffs injury, 
AmeriKan should also share in the liability to the extent of its contribution toward 
workers' compensation. 
Other Courts have found approaches to resolve such matters consistent with 
the foregoing standards. For example, see Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 
20 
641 (1961). And set, American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (Torts), 578 P.2d 
899 (1978), where the court modified the common law equitable indemnity 
doctrine to permit "comparative indemnity" between multiple tortfeasors. The 
Witt court ruled that the employer and the third party should, to the extent 
consistent with the employer's statutory immunity from tort liability, share the 
burden of the employee's recovery as joint tortfeasors, and thus the concurrently 
negligent employer should receive either credit or reimbursement for the amount 
by which its compensation liability exceeds its proportional share of the injured 
employee's recovery. Under Witt, the court held that when the issue of the 
employer's concurrent negligence arises in an action, the third party tortfeasor 
may plead the employer's negligence as a partial defense. Under American 
Motorcycle, the court permited the trier of fact to determine the employer's degree 
of fault, and then allowed deduction for the employer's percentage share of the 
employee's total recovery from the third party's liability (up to the amount of 
compensation benefits assessed against the employer).4 
Such relatively straight-forward solutions avoid the parade of horribles 
4
 Correspondingly, the court also ruled that the employer should be 
denied any claim of reimbursement or any lien to the extent that its 
contribution would then fall short of his percentage share of responsiblility for 
the employee's total recovery. 
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which Defendant envisions should Plaintiff be properly compensated in this case. 
V. Plaintiff Thompson Did Argue to the Court Below that He was a Mere 
By-stander. 
Defendant incorrectly asserts in her Answering Brief (page 45) that Plaintiff 
Thompson did not contend in the court below that he was merely a "bystander" 
at the time of his injury in this case. Thus, Defendant argues, it is "impermissible" 
to raise this point for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant is simply inaccurate with respect to the premise of her argument 
on this point. In Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment (page 25), which is a part of the record in this matter, 
Plaintiff states: 
Without applying the Restatement principles in a case 
such as this, the burden of a loss which exceed the 
limited recovery available under workers' compensation 
law would be borne primarily by the worker-in this case 
the Plaintiff, who in fact was really an innocent 
bystander at the time of the accident. [Emphasis added.] 
Plaintiff Thompson had indeed been an employee of AmeriKan. However, 
when the accident occurred, Plaintiff Thompson was not working within the scope 
and course of his employment. Thompson had not been assigned by AmeriKan 
to assist Jensen in delivering the pipe, and certainly had not been assigned to assist 
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in hoisting and installing the pipe over the stub. Rather, Thompson on his own 
accord decided to join Jensen "to keep him company" while Jensen dropped off 
the piece of pipe. When Defendant Jess insisted on changing the nature of the 
work, Plaintiff Thompson merely watched from the sidelines as Jensen attempted 
to do a "favor" for Jess. It was during this time while Plaintiff Thompson was a 
mere by-stander watching Jensen perform a job which AmeriKan had not assigned 
that Plaintiff was injured. 
Under such particular circumstances, Thompson should be determined to 
fall within the term "others" as set forth in the Restatement Rules. This issue was 
raised by Plaintiff in the court below and may be argued here. 
10. CONCLUSION AND REQUESTED RELIEF 
The trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. There are several genuine issues of material fact which should be 
decided by a jury. Defendant Jess took control over inherently dangerous 
work and failed to provide special precautions to insure that the work could be 
performed safely. Defendant should not be allowed to shield herself from 
liability merely because she purchased a piece of pipe from AmeriKan. 
Moreover, the Defendant owes a non-delegable duty of care to insure the safe 
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performance of work on her property. Thompson, who was a mere by-stander 
at the time of his injury, is entitled to a jury trial in this matter. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this 
matter for trial. 
Dated: August 18, 1998. 
John Paul Kennedy and 
David J. Bennion 
Plaintiffs Attorneys 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two copies of the foregoing 
Opening Brief of the Appellant were served upon the persons named below by 
personal delivery to the stated address on the date indicated. 
Dated: August 19, 1998. 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Joseph E. Minnock 
136 South Main #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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